Design and Performance of Resource Allocation Mechanisms forNetwork Slicing

Abstract

Next generation wireless networks are expected to handle an exponential increase in demand for capacity generated by a collection of tenants and/or services with heterogeneous requirements. Multi-tenant network sharing, enabled through virtualization and network slicing, offers the opportunity to reduce operational and deployment costs, and the challenge of managing resource allocations among multiple tenants serving possibly mobile diverse customers. When designing shared radio resource allocation mechanisms, it is as important to provide tenants with customization and isolation guarantees, as it is to achieve high resource utilization and to do so via low complexity and easy to implement algorithms. This thesis is devoted to the design and analysis of resource allocation mechanisms that meet these objectives. We propose a sharing model in which tenants are assigned a share/budget of a pool of network resources. This share is then redistributed in the form of weights amongst users, which in turn drive dynamic resource allocations which are partially able to adapt to the traffic demands on, and requirements of, different slices customer populations. We propose and analyze two approaches for redistributing slices’ share among customers which we classify into their associated (i) cooperative, and (ii) competitive resource allocations. In the cooperative resource allocation setting, a pre-established policy is proposed, in which resources are eventually assigned in proportion to the slice’s share and the relative number of active users in currently has at a resource. This is shown to be socially optimal in a particular setting and simple to implement, with statistical multiplexing gains that increase with the number of tenants and the size of the resource pool. These gains stem from the ability of the scheme to adapt to dynamic loads leading to an up to 50% network capacity savings with respect to static allocations. We further improve these gains by presenting a framework that combines resource allocation and wireless user association which uses limited computational, information, and handoff overheads. However, using our cooperative scheme over a large pool of resources restricts the degree to which a slice can differentiate its customers’ performance at a per resource level. Thus, we study how this trade-off affects the network utility and propose a mechanism to determine an optimal partition the resources into a collection of self-managed pools under cooperative resource allocations. Our competitive resource allocation approach enables tenants to reap the performance benefits of sharing while retaining the ability to customize their own users’ allocations. This setting results in a network slicing game in which each tenant reacts to the user allocations of the others so as to maximize its own customers’ utility. We show that, under appropriate conditions, the game associated with such strategic behavior converges to a Nash equilibrium. At the Nash equilibrium, a tenant always achieves the same, or better, utility than it could achieve under a static partitioning of resources, hence providing the same level of inter-slice protection as static resource partitioning. The network utility of the equilibrium allocations is shown to be, under mild conditions, close to the socially optimal ones. The competitive resource allocation framework is complemented with a study on admission control policies that enable tenants to ensure minimum rate guarantees to their users. Our analysis and extensive simulation results confirm that our framework provides a comprehensive practical solution towards multi-tenant network slicing. We also discuss how our theoretical results fill a gap in the general resource allocation literature for strategic players.