Design and Analysis of State-Feedback Optimal Strategies for the Differential Game of Active Defense

Abstract

This paper is concerned with a scenario of active target defense modeled as a zero-sum differential game. The differential game theory as developed by Isaacs provides the correct framework for the analysis of pursuit-evasion conflicts and the design of optimal strategies for the players involved in the game. This paper considers an Attacker missile pursuing a Target aircraft protected by a Defender missile which aims at intercepting the Attacker before the latter reaches the Target aircraft. A differential game is formulated where the two opposing players/teams try to minimize/maximize the distance between the Target and the Attacker at the time of interception of the Attacker by the Defender and such time indicates the termination of the game. The Attacker aims to minimize the terminal distance between itself and the Target at the moment of its interception by the Defender. The opposing player/team consists of two cooperating agents: The Target and the Defender. These two agents cooperate in order to accomplish the two objectives: Guarantee interception of the Attacker by the Defender and maximize the terminal Target-Attacker separation. In this paper, we provide a complete, closed form solution of the active target defense differential game; we synthesize closed-loop state feedback optimal strategies for the agents and obtain the Value function of the game. We characterize the Target's escape set and show that the Value function is continuous and continuously differentiable over the Target's escape set, and that it satisfies the Hamilton–Jacobi–Isaacs equation everywhere in this set.