Abstract
Vickrey auction has its comparative advantages [1] in economic perspectives. In second price sealed-bid auction, bidderspsila bidding strategies are not affected by closing method. In a first-price auction, bidders always bid below their values. In year 2007, author proposed one round first price anonymous auction protocol [2] to solve the tie problem in one round auction. This paper is to extend the one round anonymous auction protocol from first price to second price auction protocol.
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