Design and Analysis of a Denial-of-Service-Resistant Quality-of-Service Signaling Protocol for MANETs

Abstract

Quality-of-service (QoS) signaling protocols for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are highly vulnerable to attacks. In particular, a class of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks can severely cripple network performance with relatively little effort expended by the attacker. A distributed QoS signaling protocol that is resistant to a class of DoS attacks on signaling is proposed. The signaling protocol provides QoS for real-time traffic and employs mechanisms at the medium access control (MAC) layer, which serve to avoid potential attacks on network resource usage. The key MAC layer mechanisms that provide support for the QoS signaling scheme include sensing of available bandwidth, traffic policing, and rate monitoring, all of which are performed in a distributed manner by the mobile nodes. The proposed signaling scheme achieves a compromise between signaling protocols that require the maintenance of per-flow state and those that are completely stateless. The signaling scheme scales gracefully in terms of the number of nodes and/or traffic flows in the MANET. The authors analyze the security properties of the protocol and present simulation results to demonstrate its resistance to DoS attacks