Abstract

This paper addresses a certain objection to the quantificational theory of definite descriptions. According to this objection, the quantificational account cannot provide correct interpretations of definite descriptions embedded in the non-doxastic attitude ascriptions and therefore ought to be rejected. In brief, the objection says that the quantificational theory is committed to the view that a sentence of the form “The F is G” is equivalent to the claim that there is a unique F and it is G, while the ascription such as, e.g., “S wants the F to be G” is not equivalent to the statement that S wants there to be a (unique) F and for it to be G. I argue that this objection is invalid as it rests on a false assumption concerning the substitutivity of the relative clauses in the non-doxastic attitude ascriptions.

Highlights

  • According to the quantificational theory of indefinite and definite descriptions, these phrases are not genuinely referring expressions, but are incomplete symbols which introduce a complex quantificational structure into a sentence in which they occur

  • A sentence of the form ‘‘A/an F is G’’ expresses the proposition equivalent to the claim that there exists an object which has the property expressed in the nominal ‘‘F’’ and the property expressed in the predicate ‘‘G’’; a sentence with a definite description is equivalent to the claim that there is exactly one F and it is G

  • We see that the problem with the Principle of Substitutivity is not restricted to the cases with presuppositional differences, and this shows that any explanation of the problem which appeals to the theory of presupposition projection does not get to the heart of the puzzle

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Summary

Introduction

According to the quantificational theory of indefinite and definite descriptions, these phrases are not genuinely referring expressions, but are incomplete symbols which introduce a complex quantificational structure into a sentence in which they occur. (3) Hans wants there to be a unique ghost in his attic and for it to be quiet This reading is incorrect in the light of the earlier background assumption. The problem is that (3) clearly implies that Hans wishes that there would exist a unique ghost in his attic. This is inconsistent with the contextual information. Based on the above observations, the opponents of the quantificational approach conclude that this approach is basically wrong, namely, it ascribes incorrect truth conditions to ‘‘The F is G’’ (see: Elbourne 2010: 2–3, Schoubye 2013: 498–499) In other words, they argue that the following statements do not have the same truth conditions:.

Principle of substitutivity
Assumptions that underlie the objection
Problems with Substitutivity Principle
Non-doxastic attitude ascriptions and analytically equivalent statements
Are presuppositions the key?
Two features of non-doxastic attitudes
Conditionals and concluding remarks
Full Text
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