Descartes and Hobbes on the Passions

Abstract

Rene Descartes (1596–1650) and Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) were contemporaries who met briefly but not amicably, who engaged in an acerbic published debate on issues raised by Descartes’ Meditations, and who were openly critical of one another’s fundamental premises. Descartes said of Hobbes’ moral philosophy in De Cive that it was very dangerous, because it supposed all human beings to be wicked, and thus gave them occasion to be so.1 Hobbes retorted that Descartes might well be the best geometer in the world, but that he had no knack for philosophy.2 Leo Strauss nevertheless calls attention to their common disdain for the unscientific and impractical character of the ancient treatises on morality, and even observes that “... Hobbes’ own system of morals corresponds better to Descartes’ deepest intention than does the morality of Les passions de l’âme.”3 In the same spirit, Richard Kennington claims that Descartes shared with Hobbes the modern conviction that reason serves the passions, and that what distinguishes humans from animals is the more malleable instrumentality of human reason, rather than some specifically different end.4 On this interpretation, we ought to construe Descartes’ treatise on the passions in the light of his fundamental project, i.e., to develop a universal method designed to promote the mastery of nature.