Descartes and Ancient Skepticism: Reheated Cabbage?

Abstract

Chapter 13 considers a variety of ways in which Pyrrhonian skepticism has been thought to differ from Cartesian skepticism: that is, from the sort of skepticism Descartes describes in (among other places) Meditation 1. For example, it has been argued that Pyrrhonian skepticism disavows belief, whereas Cartesian skepticism disavows only knowledge. It has also been argued that Pyrrhonian skepticism is less extensive than Cartesian skepticism is, and that Pyrrhonian but not Cartesian skepticism is a way of life. This chapter argues, however, that Pyrrhonian skepticism is closer to Cartesian skepticism than it is often taken to be, siding with Descartes in his statement that what is new is not the skepticism he describes, but his refutation of it.