Deregulating the input market by central inspection: Lessons from China's primary land market

Abstract

Leveraging a reform that assigns central inspectorates to local units in China to oversee industrial land transactions, this study examines the effects of unleashing the local government's influence on land prices using a difference-in-differences design. Our research provides compelling evidence that the reform leads to an additional 50% increase in industrial land prices and significantly enhances the productivity of local industrial firms. The rise in land prices can be attributed to an increase in market-oriented transactions. Additionally, we discover an improvement in the quality of new entrants and a reduction in resource misallocation following the reform. By demonstrating the positive externalities of central supervision on local government intervention in the industrial land market, our findings suggest that, in certain cases, central inspection can mitigate distorting behaviors of the local government in input markets. This, in turn, facilitates the screening of productive entrants and hinders investments by unproductive incumbents, thereby improving the overall productivity of economic entities.