Der Quasi-Markt für Arbeitsvermittlung in Deutschland: Welche Rolle spielen Vertrags- und Trägermerkmale bei ausgeschriebenen Vermittlungsdienstleistungen?

Abstract

Abstract In Germany, the public employment service partially contracts out job placement services to private providers. Do the private provider’s characteristics or the contract design or remuneration influence the job searcher’s probability to be placed into a new job? To answer these questions we analyze unique administrative data of the Federal Employment Agency with cox proportional hazard regressions. Job searchers have a higher propensity to be placed into a new job by a private provider when the provider is a non-profit organization or when the private provider had above-average placement rates in the past. Result-oriented remuneration of providers, such as “no-cure, no pay” and “nocure, less pay” models and contract elements that allow enhancing quality, positively influence the propensity to obtain a job.