Depletion-of-Battery Attack: Specificity, Modelling and Analysis.

Abstract

The emerging Internet of Things (IoT) has great potential; however, the societal costs of the IoT can outweigh its benefits. To unlock IoT potential, there needs to be improvement in the security of IoT applications. There are several standardization initiatives for sensor networks, which eventually converge with the Internet of Things. As sensor-based applications are deployed, security emerges as an essential requirement. One of the critical issues of wireless sensor technology is limited sensor resources, including sensor batteries. This creates a vulnerability to battery-exhausting attacks. Rapid exhaustion of sensor battery power is not only explained by intrusions, but can also be due to random failure of embedded sensor protocols. Thus, most wireless sensor applications, without tools to defend against rash battery exhausting, would be unable to function during prescribed times. In this paper, we consider a special type of threat, in which the harm is malicious depletion of sensor battery power. In contrast to the traditional denial-of-service attack, quality of service under the considered attack is not necessarily degraded. Moreover, the quality of service can increase up to the moment of the sensor set crashes. We argue that this is a distinguishing type of attack. Hence, the application of a traditional defense mechanism against this threat is not always possible. Therefore, effective methods should be developed to counter the threat. We first discuss the feasibility of rash depletion of battery power. Next, we propose a model for evaluation of energy consumption when under attack. Finally, a technique to counter the attack is discussed.