Dependency links can hinder the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on lattices and networks.

Abstract

Networks with dependency links are more vulnerable when facing the attacks. Recent research also has demonstrated that the interdependent groups support the spreading of cooperation. We study the prisoner’s dilemma games on spatial networks with dependency links, in which a fraction of individual pairs is selected to depend on each other. The dependency individuals can gain an extra payoff whose value is between the payoff of mutual cooperation and the value of temptation to defect. Thus, this mechanism reflects that the dependency relation is stronger than the relation of ordinary mutual cooperation, but it is not large enough to cause the defection of the dependency pair. We show that the dependence of individuals hinders, promotes and never affects the cooperation on regular ring networks, square lattice, random and scale-free networks, respectively. The results for the square lattice and regular ring networks are demonstrated by the pair approximation.