Dependency and Deception in Ultimatum Bargaining

Abstract

In two experiments we studied the relation between dependency and deception in the ultimatum bargaining game. Participants could deceive the other player about the value of the chips they bargained over. Dependency was manipulated by manipulating the consequences of rejecting a proposal for both parties. In one condition the share of the allocator was decreased by 90% when the proposal was rejected, while the share of the recipient was only decreased by 10%. In the other condition these values were reversed. In our first experiment all participants were assigned the role of recipient. Results showed that recipients deceived more often when they were high dependent. This finding was replicated in our second experiment in which participants were either recipient or allocator. Allocators did not deceive more often when they were high dependent, but offered more chips to the recipient instead. The results are discussed in terms of the instrumentality of deception.