Deontological evidentialism, wide-scope, and privileged values

Abstract

Deontological evidentialism (DE) is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of (DE). I then use this very distinction against a defense of (DE) inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again to argue that Hilary Kornblith’s criticism of Richard Feldman’s defense of (DE) is incomplete. Finally, I argue that Feldman’s defense is insensitive to the relation between normative requirements and privileged values: values that have normative authority over us.