Abstract
In this paper we argue in favor of the existence of two different guilt feelings: altruistic guilt (AG) and deontological guilt (DG). AG arises from having harmed, through one's own action or omission, an innocent victim, while DG arises from the transgression of an internalized norm. In most daily experiences of guilt feelings both types are present, but we argue that they are not traceable to each other and that each can be present without the other. We show that the two guilt feelings can be distinguished with reference to behavioral, cognitive, and neurophysiological aspects. Moreover, we demonstrate that they are differently related to other processes and emotions. AG is connected with pain, empathy and ToM. DG is strongly related to disgust. We briefly illustrate some implications for moral psychology and clinical psychology.
Highlights
In a review of literature about guilt feelings, Carnì et al (2013) distinguish three main approaches: intrapsychic, interpersonal and integrated
In keeping with the purpose of this article, we are interested in addressing a very specific question, namely, whether there is a privileged relationship between deontological guilt (DG) and disgust but not between altruistic guilt (AG) and disgust, as suggested by the findings of Basile et al (2011), Ottaviani et al (2018a), Salvo et al, and by the findings of Robinson et al (2019): “In all three studies, we found that trait disgust sensitivity predicted more extreme deontological judgment” (Robinson et al, 2019)
The distinction between the two sense of guilt yields implications and indications for future research, which we present in the paragraphs that follow and which regard the relationships between the two senses of guilt and System I and II, a possible explanation of omission bias, some psychopathologies such as obsessive compulsive disorder and major depression disorder, and, a suggestion for research on the role of the
Summary
In a review of literature about guilt feelings, Carnì et al (2013) distinguish three main approaches: intrapsychic, interpersonal and integrated. The great difference between the two motivations is illustrated by a well-known novel, Sophie’s Choice (Styron, 1979), which investigates the possibility of pursuing the good of others in order to fulfill the duties connected to one’s own role and at the same time feeling guilty for having compromised one’s own affective goal. I still feel very guilty about not staying with her and not holding her hand while she passed away In both examples, the guilt feeling derives from the impairment of the altruistic goal of being close to the victim by participating in his suffering. The guilt feeling derives from the impairment of the altruistic goal of being close to the victim by participating in his suffering It could be asked why both the protagonists did not feel disappointed or pained rather than guilty. AG feelings may include a sense of anguished pain for the victim, a propensity to saying “I’m sorry” instead of “Excuse me,” “Pardon me,” a compassionate attitude, the tendency to focus attention on the suffering victim, and the attempt to alleviate the victim’s suffering at one’s own expense (Basile and Mancini, 2011)
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