Abstract
In „Undeniably Paradoxical: Reply to Jacquette,‟ John Barker offers a criticism of my recent Polish Journal of Philosophy essay, „Denying the Liar.‟ If Barker is right, then I have correctly but unsurprisingly shown only that a construction other than the liar is not genuinely paradoxical, while leaving the liar paradox itself, properly so-called, completely untouched. Barker twice in the essay accuses my reasoning of being „flawed,‟ but Barker‟s own exposition and criticism is riddled from beginning to end with confusions and misunderstandings. Barker‟s errors, as I show in what follows, concern not only my argument, but his interpretation and application of the classical literature and logical principles he cites in trying to refute my analysis of the liar. As usual, it takes more paper and ink to set these matters straight than to present the original argument or its criticism.
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