Demosclerosis: Implications for Agricultural Policy

Abstract

group representation influences U.S. agricultural policy and policy making. Our argument is that the evolution and proliferation of interest groups involved in the agricultural policy process seriously impedes any comprehensive or coordinated reformulation of the policies concerned. The primary cause of this impasse is the propensity of interest groups to evolve and organize in ways most compatible with the institutional structure of government. As Skowronek observed in his study of the creation of the administrative state, politics produces changes in both public policy and in the interest groups that influence policy. Politics does not simply protect or change policy. It also establishes those interest groups that influence future policy decisions. We can state a major tenet derived from this observation that guides our conclusions: If the demand for interest groups and what interest groups offer policy makers is lacking, then what these groups supply has no value. So, historically in U.S. politics, agricultural interest groups have labored to create value by matching their behavior to the periodically changing nature of policy-making institutions. Why does this course of action impede significant policy reform? James Madison at least partially answered this question in Federalist Paper Number 10. He noted that a decentralized, constitutionally separated and balanced government will have a difficult and slow time deciding. Decisions are made more difficult, Madison contended, because this structure of government fosters the creation of interest groups. When there are many points of access in a decentralized government, interest groups will form to exploit these access points and to influence policy decisions. As groups proliferate, decision making becomes even more difficult. Opportunity sets are affected, potential legislative exchanges proliferate, interests fix their political assets, and transaction costs escala e (Williamson, North). Consequently, public policies are subject to both constant tinkering and systematic expansion of new programs and legislative provisions intended to satisfy, even in a partial way, recently involved interests. Few programs are eliminated, even under severe budget pressure, because each has champions among interest groups and in the legislature. Even if programs fail by the standards of rational and systematic analysis, few of those holding legitimate politial influence will see things that way. As Rauch (p. 134) observes, disagreements will persist which programs have failed, and even about what 'failing' means. The obstacles created by interest group proliferation are well known to students of political economy. A missing element in Rauch's analysis, however, is that such proliferation is only possible if Congress is responsive to the policy preferences expressed by groups. A major element of our analysis, missing from Rauch's book, is that changes in the institutional rules in Congress play a major role in explaining the persistence of demosclerois. These changes have expanded the ability of individual members to satisfy the interests of their constituents and have increased the access of interest groups to the policy process. This combination of increased responsiveness by members and increased access for interest groups provides the opportunities to achieve the policy gains that encourage interest group proliferation.