Demonstrative Reference, the Relational View of Experience, and the Proximality Principle

Abstract

AbstractThe relational view of conscious perceptual experience is the view that conscious perceptual experience is a relation between perceiver and objects and properties perceived. A perceiver experiencing a yellow lemon stands in a relation to the lemon and its yellowness. The relational view grounds our knowledge of reference because, in using demonstratives to refer to perceived objects, perceivers know which objects they perceptually attend to for they stand in relations to those very objects. This chapter defends the relational view of experience against a charge by Burge that it is incompatible with a principle, the Proximality Principle, that, according to Burge, vision science rests upon. The multi‐pronged defense proposes that Burge's attack proves too much, excising the distinction between seeing and hallucinating and diminishing the importance of attention and perceptual conscious experience to knowledge of demonstrative reference.