Democratization and the Indonesian Middle Class: Waiting for Godot?

Abstract

Theories of democracy cast the middle class in a starring role. As Barrington Moore pithily put it, ‘No bourgeoisie, no democracy’.2 Crudely put, the upper class has too much to lose to engage in reform and, if a stable democracy is to emerge, the middle class must become its standard bearer. Seymour Martin Lipset believed that a large middle class was a prerequisite for an enduring democracy.3 This intellectual tradition, in turn, finds its foundations in economic determinism. The modernization school from Daniel Lerner to Alex Inkeles envisioned rising incomes going with increasingly open forms of political discourse. Since at least Karl Marx, most social scientists have believed that economic and social conditions determine political attitudes and modes of political organization. Economists assume that individual economic interests (mostly short term) drive human behavior, and that around the world ‘human’ is assumed to be ‘economicman’.4 A democracy’s legitimacy is based on popular sovereignty and public opinion. At the end of the day, the endurance of democracy depends on both the ideas of common citizens and the attitudes and actions of the elites who design and operate political institutions. A sustainable democracy requires both trust-filled elites, with sufficient confidence to leave office if they lose an election, and at least a minimally knowledgeable mass public. Theories about the middle class assume it will stand for something distinctive in politics, that is, the middle class should hold a coherent set of information, attitudes, and behaviors that distinguishes it from the upper and lower classes.