Democratic transition with those responsible for martial law? : Moral criticism of the Polish round table talks

Abstract

Although martial law in Poland, introduced on 13 December 1981, was lifted on 22 July 1983, its effects were decisive on several levels until the 1989 transition to democratic rule. Beyond the persecution of the opposition – from the internment and imprisonment of its leaders to the fragmentation of Solidarity – it also put an end to any lingering belief in the system’s reformability and gradually forced the Jaruzelski regime onto the path of expediency. Thus, in addition to the deepening economic crisis, the need to reach a mutual compromise brought to the negotiating table the leadership of the state and Lech Wałęsa’s Citizens’ Committee as the constructive opposition. As a conse- quence, other opposition organisations such as Fighting Solidarity, the Confederation of Independent Poland or the Federation of Fighting Youth sharply criticised not only the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR), but also the mainstream opposition, which was ready to compromise. They pointed to the worst sins of the communist regime, which had become a negotiating partner, with the latest martial law at their head. The clash of these morally-based criticisms with the views of those trying to avoid further bloodshed through negotiations deepened the internal conflicts of the Polish opposition and have proven to be crucial in the contemporary assessment of Poland’s transition from Communism to the present democratic system.