DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND COERCIVELY ENFORCED BORDERS

Michael Rabinder James

doi:10.21814/eps.4.1.185

Abstract

Arash Abizadeh argues that all coercive enforcement of borders is democratically illegitimate, since foreigners do not participate in the creation of border laws. It is irrelevant whether the border laws are substantively just or unjust, whether the state enforcing them is affluent or poor, and whether the individual being coerced autonomously chooses to cross the border or is forced by desperate circumstances to do so. His argument involves (1) a foundational commitment to individual autonomy; (2) a normative premise that coercion requires democratic legitimation; (3) and an empirical premise that border enforcement laws subject all foreigners to state coercion. In this essay, I contest each of these components. I challenge the empirical premise through examples illustrating the empirical limits to state coercion over foreigners. I contest the normative premise by showing that state coercion requires democratic legitimation only for those involuntarily and indefinitely subject to it. Finally, I challenge the commitment to individual autonomy as foundational to political legitimacy by distinguishing political legitimacy from political authority. I conclude by demonstrating how my critique renders a more plausible account of the normative limits of border coercion, one that coheres more readily with stances advanced by Javier Hidalgo and Abizadeh himself.

Highlights

In an enormously influential article, Arash Abizadeh argues that all coercively enforced border laws are democratically illegitimate
There are three core steps in Abizadeh’s argument: (1) a foundational commitment to individual autonomy; (2) a normative premise that coercion requires democratic legitimation; (3) and an empirical premise that border enforcement laws subject all foreigners to state coercion
Abizadeh’s argument comprises three core steps: (1) a foundational commitment to individual autonomy; (2) a normative premise that coercion requires democratic legitimation; (3) and an empirical premise that border enforcement laws subject all foreigners to state coercion

Summary

Introduction

In an enormously influential article, Arash Abizadeh argues that all coercively enforced border laws are democratically illegitimate. This differs from the more qualified approach of Javier Hidalgo, who defends the right to resist and the duty to disobey “unjust” immigration laws, defined as those that prevent the entry of people whose human rights would be violated if they were not admitted, even though admission would not significantly harm members of the receiving state (Hidalgo, 2015, 2016) It even stands in tension with Abizadeh’s later critique of “special-obligations arguments,” a critique aimed at “wealthier polities” that restrict immigration of absolutely or relatively poor immigrants from “globally poor regions” in order to improve the wellbeing of poorer people within wealthy states I challenge the commitment to individual autonomy as foundational to political legitimacy by drawing on Allen Buchanan’s distinction between political legitimacy and political authority

Abizadeh’s Argument

The Empirical Premise

The Normative Premise

The Foundational Commitment to Autonomy

Conclusion