Democratic consolidation and failure: Lessons from Bangladesh and Pakistan

Abstract

The long transitions from military rule in Pakistan (1977–88) and Bangladesh (1975–90) have been almost completely ignored in studies of democratization. They deserve more attention, partly because, from the methodological point of view, the many similarities between them help us to isolate the most important factors that lead to successful transitions and democratic consolidation. The contrast between Bangladesh, which successfully consolidated its democracy in the 1990s, and Pakistan, which did not, demonsrates the general importance of three factors. First, it lends support to Alfred Stepan's argument in Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (1988), that cases where the ‘military as institution’ is threatened by continuing in power ‐ as in Bangladesh ‐ will be more likely to make a successful transition. Second, the contrast between Bangladesh and Pakistan brings out the critical importance of an autonomous civil society ‐ which exists in Bangladesh but not Pakistan ‐ during a transition from authoritarian rule. At crucial moments in 1987, 1990 and 1996 civil society in Bangladesh forced reluctant and corrupt politicians to unite in opposition to the military government and then to successfully reform the new democracy's political institutions. Third, ethnic polarization. Ethnic polarization ‐intensified, ironically, by several consociational policies designed to reduce conflict ‐is a major factor hampering the development of a non‐ethnic civil society capable of pressuring the military and politicians to democratize.