Democratic compatibilism

Abstract

ABSTRACT The argument that democratic authority is superior to other forms of authority on the basis of its respect for the personal autonomy of citizens faces a fatal problem that I term the problem of negligible influence. No individual citizen can expect to exert any meaningful influence over political outcomes in a mass democracy. How can democracy, therefore, be said to respect autonomy where this autonomy is conceived of in terms of the ability to govern one’s own life? This paper draws on free will compatibilism to overcome this problem. The problem of negligible influence is outlined, and it is shown how existing approaches within the literature fail to adequately respond to it. I then develop a view – democratic compatibilism – that responds to the problem in two stages. First, I show that personal autonomy does not in fact require that individual citizens have any causal control over political decision-making and, second, I show that the conditions which personal autonomy does require are more likely to be fulfilled under democratic authority than under alternative forms of political authority.