Abstract
AbstractAn extensive climate policy literature provides various recommendations for mitigating climate change, but these recommendations are not supported democratically, since the models employed consider either infinitely-lived individuals or normative social objectives (or both). In contrast, the present paper provides policy recommendations capable of incorporating democratic processes. I develop an overlapping generation model with political process micro-foundations and show how democratic climate policies are interconnected with other democratic policies. Time inconsistent social objectives combined with commitment issues lead to an inefficient tax on capital accumulation and a climate policy below the efficient level; while suppressing the tax on capital accumulation generates a climate policy even further below the efficient level. I derive a novel politico-economic Keynes–Ramsey rule for the market interest rate, which is useful for calculating the climate policy level. I show that individual pure time preference, individual altruism toward descendants, and young generation political power are key determinants of democratic climate policy ambition.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have