Democratic Breakdown and the Hidden Perils of the Democratic Peace

Abstract

One empirical regularity in International Relations appears consistent: democracies rarely fight one another. However, this article maintains that the democratic peace comes with hidden costs. Democratic regimes are more pacifistic toward each other, but regimes formed through democratic breakdown are more bellicose than other authoritarian regimes. I argue that autocracies established through democratic breakdown are especially aggressive because they select leaders who tend to be impatient with democratic norms, and these leaders can leverage nationalism and mass mobilization fomented during the democratic era to support international aggression. Additionally, I argue that these factors interact with important institutional features that vary across authoritarian regimes. Post-democratic leaders lacking institutional constraints on their executive authority should be more aggressive than constrained post-democratic leaders and other unconstrained autocrats. Statistical analysis of militarized interstate disputes demonstrates that autocracies are more belligerent following democratic breakdown, especially under institutional conditions favorable to leaders instigating the breakdown. We should therefore be wary of urging democratization based on democratic peace when democracy has a high chance of reverting and focus more effort on ensuring that current democracies do not break down.