Democracy, Veto Players and Integration in Mercosur

Abstract

It is expected that political and institutional variables can facilitate, in a large or a small way, the process of integration among the countries members of Mercosul, once its structure and mechanisms of decision-making can interfere in the approval or not of fundamental measures to the process of integration considered. In this sense, this article has two aims: first, considering the institutional arrangement currently in use, it tries to investigate main questions of the institutional analysis of Mercosur, such as: who are the veto players capable to veto the proposals to change the status quo? Who controls the agenda of these proposals? And what are the positions of these veto players face each other? Considering also the political and economic conditions of the country – members of Mercosur, it analyses their forms of democracy, discussing the importance of the role of institutional and collective agents with power veto, attempting to verify the levels of difficulties imposed to the deepening of the process of regional integration in the Mercosul by each country. The analysis described has to take into account the desired levels of regional integration, once with deeper process of integration we will have more economic sectors involved, which, in its turn, if harmed, it will tend to demand their representations with power veto. Second, using a PROBIT Model, we conclude that more veto players, in more democratic regimes, generated difficulties for the regional process of integration in Mercosur, considering the possibility of integration between Brazil and the others members.