Abstract
The implementation of punishment has proven a prominent solution to prevent the breakdown of cooperation in social dilemma situations. In fact, numerous studies show that punishment possibilities are effective in maintaining cooperative behavior. However, punishment is often not efficient in terms (a) of monetary benefits and in light of the fact (b) that punishment of cooperators (i.e., antisocial punishment) can occur. Still, recent research revealed that individuals vote for the implementation of such punishment systems. We address this contradiction by proposing that the benefits of democratic punishment systems in particular cannot be solely captured by monetary outcomes. Instead, the implementation of democratic punishment systems may enhance the psychological benefits of justice perceptions, satisfaction, and trust. Using iterated public goods games, the findings of the present study reveal not only higher cooperation levels and total payoffs in two different democratic punishment systems compared to other systems, but also higher justice perception, satisfaction, and trust. Furthermore, participants indicated the highest willingness to continue interactions in democratic punishment systems. Moreover, satisfaction, not monetary outcomes, was the best predictor of participants’ willingness to stay in a system. Therefore, we argue that the efficiency of democratic punishment systems cannot be measured solely in monetary outcomes but that psychological benefits must be considered.
Highlights
In a globalized world where many collective problems can only be solved in a cooperative manner, studies investigating the possibilities and limitations of human cooperation are undoubtedly more important than ever (Camerer, 2003; Rand and Nowak, 2013; Van Lange et al, 2013)
Average cooperation rates in the peer punishment system with shared costs (PPSC) was significantly higher compared to the system without punishment, but were not significantly different from the peer punishment system and the democratic punishment system
The present research focused on how the characteristics of different punishment systems influence cooperative behavior in a social dilemma
Summary
In a globalized world where many collective problems can only be solved in a cooperative manner (e.g., climate change actions), studies investigating the possibilities and limitations of human cooperation are undoubtedly more important than ever (Camerer, 2003; Rand and Nowak, 2013; Van Lange et al, 2013). For decades researchers from various disciplines have investigated the (evolutionary) origins of cooperative behavior (e.g., Rand et al, 2012), contextual factors like group size (Barcelo and Capraro, 2015) and time pressure (Rand et al, 2012; Tinghög et al, 2013), and individual differences related to cooperative behavior including—but not limited to—motivation and social preferences (e.g., social value orientation, Balliet et al, 2009; Bogaert et al, 2008), personality (e.g., Hilbig et al, 2012; Capraro et al, 2014), trust (Van Lange et al, 1998), and morality (Capraro and Rand, 2018) It seems that even though research on cooperation in social dilemmas is plentiful, most studies still evaluate successful cooperation and institutional designs to promote cooperation (like sanctions) through monetary or material outcomes (Balliet et al, 2011).
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