Democracy, Elite Bias, and Redistribution in Latin America

Abstract

ARE DEMOCRACIES MORE REDISTRIBUTIVE than autocracies? That is, do they enact regulatory and fiscal policies that tend to equalize market incomes and transfer wealth from the rich to the poor? If so, are there certain conditions under which this pattern is amplified—or suffocated? These questions are motivated by an influential literature on the distributive foundations of regime types that put class conflict waged between the rich and poor at the center of political life. Newer entries are centered on the median voter paradigm and are known collectively as social conflict theory.1 They are inspired by a host of celebrated earlier contributions.2 Social conflict theory makes several predictions. First, relatively unequal countries will tend to transition to democracy. Second, under democracy, the poor will take to the polls and favor policies that tax the rich and transfer income and wealth to themselves. Third, elected officials will cater to the preferences of those less well-off because the logic of electoral competition drives them to converge on the preferences of the median voter. Fourth, democracies will be more redistributive than dictatorships.3 Fifth, the magnitude of redistribution will reflect the level of inequality: a poorer median voter means greater redistribution.