Democracy comes to Europe: Franchise extension and fiscal outcomes 1830–1938

Abstract

This paper examines the relation between public spending and the spread of democracy in Western Europe during the period 1830–1938. Our data set includes measures of the size of the electorate, the election rule, and electoral participation, as well as measures of the size and composition of central government expenditures for 12 countries. We estimate panel regressions, and find that (1) the gradual lifting of socio-economic restrictions on the voting franchise contributed to growth in government spending mainly by increasing spending on infrastructure and internal security; (2) the female suffrage had a weak positive effect, through spending on health, education and welfare; (3) the change from majority to proportional rule, which took place in 10 of the countries, did not contribute to growth in government spending, and held back spending on health, education and welfare; (4) there exists (weak) complementarity between economic development and the spread of democracy.