Democracy and Political Development in Africa

Political Liberalization and Democratization in Africa: Lessons from Country Experiences. Edited by Julius Omozuanvbo Ihonvbere and John Mukum Mbaku. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003. Pp. xxi, 373. $69.95. Political Liberalization and Democratization in Africa makes a solid contribution to the mounting literature on political development in Africa. Such is the case not so much because of the novel insights it presents as because of the keen, thorough descriptions provided of the democratization process in numerous African countries. This collection exhibits a coherence not often found in edited volumes. The book contains eleven country chapters on the theme of liberalization and democratization in Africa. Most of the country chapters cover similar topics within this general subject, which facilitates cross-country comparisons. The individual authors have in-depth knowledge of the countries they write about and provide illustrative examples and interesting anecdotes to support the broader principles and arguments they lay out. Thus, this book provides rich descriptions of the political experiences of most of the countries covered in the volume. The introductory chapter by editors Julius Omozuanvbo Ihonvbere and John Mukum Mbaku and the overview chapter by Mbaku on the transition to democratic governance highlight well the general themes, challenges, and dynamics found across countries. Both the introductory chapters and some of the case studies are, however, characterized by a bit of redundancy, and there are no attempts to explain why democratization appears to have progressed more fully in some cases than in others. Moreover, we are not left with any sense of whether the democratization process has differed from one geographical region to the next. Nonetheless, some of the chapters dovetail very nicely. For example, the chapters on Zambia and Malawi (both by Ihonvbere), and on South Africa (by Roger Southall) help the reader understand the dynamics of political change in the southern African region as well as the interdependent nature of different political outcomes. Unfortunately, Sam Moyo's chapter on Zimbabwe focuses almost exclusively on the land reform process and gives very little attention to other recent trends and political events. In addition, the chapter cites numerous putatively positive implications of the recent land occupations for democracy and development and gives short shrift to some well-known negative effects. …

Indian democracy is going to step its 75 years of journey. Indian democracy is still singing even after happening many ups and downs in the country and in the world. Ours is a world largest democracy. We are really, proud of it. Democracy has a long tradition and rich history in India. That means the idea that democratic ethos and principles are not new to the Indian subcontinent. Our rich democratic heritage, sets a precedent a for promoting civic culture, political participation, and a well understanding of democratic principles among its citizens. In recent, India's G20 presidency reflects its commitment to democratic values and international cooperation. The country sets an example to promote global democratic principles. The Parliament 20 (P20) Summit in New Delhi put forwards India's rich democratic heritage and core values to the world. The inclusivity, equality, and harmony are central to Indian democracy. But the scholars and theorists of Indian democracy come to realize that, the picture of our democracy of the last one decade is not so satisfactory. Democracy-watching organizations categorize democracies differently. They all classify India today as a “hybrid regime”—that is, neither a full democracy nor a full autocracy. And this is new one. In 2021, in view of Freedom House, India’s freedom rating is Partly Free (the only remaining category is Not Free). That same year, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project India as “electoral autocracy” on its scale of closed autocracy, electoral autocracy, electoral democracy, or liberal democracy. And the Economist Intelligence Unit stated India to be “flawed democracy” on its scale of full democracy, flawed democracy, hybrid regime, and authoritarian regime. Keeping all these things in mind, in this paper, I have tried to critically examine the Indian democracy of the last one decade on the basis of a small ground level study.

The study's urgency is stipulated by the need to clarify the features of administrative discretion in states with different democracy indices (different political regimes) and to describe the verification of compliance with the limits of discretion. The article's purpose is to clarify the correlation between the understanding and administrative discretion boundaries and the type of state according to the level of democratic development. The research is based on the democracy index, determined annually by the Economist Intelligence Unit, according to which states are divided into four types: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes. A comparative method, which was used to compare the perception of administrative discretion in Germany and Ukraine as typical states of full democracies and hybrid regimes, is the basis of the research. The article clarifies that administrative discretion should be understood as a way of exercising the powers of administrative authorities, which involves choosing one of several possible options for behavior in a specific case and is carried out in compliance with the rule of law, human rights, principles of administrative procedures, and the purpose of powers; it is substantiated that in the states of hybrid regimes, the institution of administrative discretion is poorly developed, there are no clear criteria for the discretion boundaries, the issue of judicial control over decisions made by uncertain discretion, and there is excessive bureaucracy. The main provisions of the article can become guidelines for hybrid regime states to improve legislation in the area of discretion implementation.

The South African government and the ruling African National Congress shared the ambivalent responses of many African countries to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Analysing the South African response to the invasion, in the United Nations General Assembly debate and elsewhere, this paper suggests that the country’s professed “non-alignment” or neutrality was misleading, for South Africa was more critical of Western countries (and Ukraine) than of Russia. The support for an imperially minded, undemocratic Russia cast doubt on South Africa’s commitment to liberal democracy. Statements by government officials and members of civil society after the invasion suggested that liberal democracy was tainted by its association with the West. The future of democracy in South Africa is likely to be further weakened by implicit or explicit alignment in the post-invasion world with Russia against the West, for the West is unlikely to strengthen its commitment to democracy in Africa in the face of the challenges posed by Russia and China, countries that have no interest in democracy. While surveys suggest that a majority of South African citizens want their democratic system to continue, the governing elite’s alignment with Russia is likely to weaken the country’s pro-democratic forces.

Given the fact that quantitative measures of democracy in Africa are increasingly used in scholarly research, it is appropriate to ask the question: ‘Are such measures accurately reflecting empirical observations?’ To answer this question, data‐sets compiled by Zahra Arat, Tatu Vanhanen, Mark Gasiorowski, Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr, and Freedom House/Raymond Gastil are compared with qualitative observations of events affecting liberal democracy in Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. Two types of problems are found. First, there are many discrepancies between empirical observations and what is shown by the data‐sets. Second, there are inconsistencies in the quantitative measurement of democracy across countries, for example, the same phenomenon does not seem to be measured by the Jaggers and Gurr and the Freedom House/Gastil indices in South Africa and Tanzania. The discrepancies in the quantitative measures suggest that the observations of area specialists of events related to liberal democracy are important not simply to help interpret quantitative measures but to reconstruct them.

The democratic transition process, which almost all African States have inevitably swung into since the early 1980s, has made their vulnerability to social and economic crises more intense. The problems that are concomitants of these transitions, which have exacerbated the extant socio-economic problems, have been dramatized by the increased level of poverty, widening income gap, sustained low (negative in many cases) growth rate, etc. in the African states. Democracy in Africa has thus deepened the contradictions in the economy and between the weak and the powerful in both absolute and relative terms. This paper is directed at unraveling these conflicting realities, particularly the implications of the patterns for overall socio-economic development. A study of Nigeria’s experiences at `democratising' permits a clearer appreciation of the nature and trends of democracy in Africa. This is done within the context of the political economy frame work. This paper argues that, democratization in Africa is one which focuses mainly on economic deregulation and liberalization while at the same time denying the need for political decentralization that can give the weak and poor access to the gains of development, and that, the prebendial nature of politics in Africa makes it an exclusive business for the rich thus narrowing the possibility for empowerment of the poor people at the long run. It is our conclusion therefore, that the above contradictions can only be resolved if the right political context for economic democratization is created, because, in Africa, politics, more then anything else constraints economic development. Keywords: Democracy, Democratization, Socio-Economic Crises, Development and Political Economy DOI: 10.7176/JESD/12-8-03 Publication date: April 30 th 2021

With the globalization of economies over the past two decades, there has been an increasing surge in Africa for strategic political and economic relationships. Unfortunately, the political systems in the continent present serious challenges to the rest of the world as they view the countries in Africa as politically unstable and economically unsustainable. In recent years, Africa’s political process, especially the electoral system, has been discredited as incapable of supporting a viable democracy and political governance. Current trends in Africa’s political development efforts in the twenty-first century clearly indicate that to achieve and sustain democratic transformation in the entire continent, the role of the mass media, especially the new media, is critical in the production and dissemination of news and political reforms. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the role of mass communication in the political development in contemporary Africa. It specifically examines the relationship between political systems and the media in Africa, probes the strategic role of new media in the quest for sustainability of the political process, and discusses media’s contributions in encouraging citizens’ participation in political governance. The paper concludes with recommendations for integrating the role of the mass media in achieving political development and stability in the continent of Africa.

Many accounts of democratisation in Africa from the early 1990s were infused with revived Afro-optimism at the outbreak of competitive elections in country after country on the continent. As noted by Huntington (1991:174) multiparty elections mean the demise of dictatorships and in many states the first years of the 1990s were heralded as the beginning of ac omplete political renewal (Ayittey 1992; Hyden and Bratton 1992; Joseph 1992). However, soon thereafter disputed elections in key states such as Kenya and Ghana in 1992, aborted processes in Togo and Cameroon, Zambia’s disappointing second elections in 1996, and breakdowns of the democratisation process in countries including Nigeria (1993), Angola (1992), and Gambia (1994) led to ah ost of pessimistic predictions: ac ontinuation of disorder and destructive politics (Chabal and Daloz 1999), no change at all (Akinrinade 1998), political closure (Joseph 1998), semi-authoritarianism (Carothers 1997), or ar eturn to ‘big man’, neopatrimonial, clientelist, informalised and disordered politics of the continent (Ake 1996; Bratton 1998; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Mbembe 1995; Villalon 1998). 1 While an umber of states have become either electoral or fully liberal democracies, many countries in Africa are still run by electoral authoritarian regimes. This article analyses the role of opposition parties’ behaviour in institutionalising democratic elections in electoral autocracies, and the effects of opposition choices on transformation of electoral authoritarian regimes to democracies. Specifically, the choices of opposition parties either to contest or boycott elections, and either accept or reject the outcome of the polls, are addressed in the analysis. The question is what type of opposition behaviour increases the likelihood of electoral autocracies becoming democracies and increasing participation, competition, and legitimacy? Political parties’ behaviour varies in important ways and that variation is taken as given in this article. One could legitimately also ask why opposition parties chose to act differently depending for example on the structural cleavages they represent (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), incentives of electoral systems they face (Sartori 1976; Lijphart 1984), the preferences of voters they seek to catch (Downs 1957), or because they are office-, voter-, or policy-seeking parties (Strom 1990). Seeking to explain the behaviour of opposition parties in Africa’s emerging democracies would be an interesting subject, but the focus on the con

This consideration of the task of building a ‘non‐racial, non‐sexist democracy’ in South Africa combines historical experience, political theory and survey results to which an organisational participation, democratic commitment, party allegiance and a sense of citizenship exist together in forms able to support a process of democratisation. In consequence, the author suggests that there are serious hazards inherent in either the liberal or Gramscian models of democratic development. On the one hand, Gramsci's idea of a ‘regulated society’ in which the state progressively recedes in favour of an increasingly complex and articulated civil society makes too little provision for those elements of civil society that remain neutral or even hostile towards the prevailing political order. On the other hand, liberal democracy, in its various forms, is inherently elitist, depoiiticised and fundamentally alienated. The survey findings confirm that both these problems are fundamental to South Africa's new political society. As an alternative, the article proposes a strategy drawn from recent work on Latin America ‐ a ‘politicised civil society’ which will link the concerns of individual citizens more closely to the more formal processes of state and party politics. ROAPE considers this argument to be important beyond South Africa's borders and hopes that this article will initiate a discussion on the problems of extending democracy in Africa far beyond the parliamentary circulation of elites where it is presently confined.

Although scholars have pointed to a global problem of constitutional illiteracy, the situation is particularly acute in Africa. Unlike in most Western democracies, constitutional literacy and the need for measures to address it have not attracted the necessary attention in Africa at either national or continental levels. The contention of this paper is that the future of constitutionalism, democracy, and good governance in Africa depends not only on how sound constitutions are but on how well the people of the continent know the constitutions, appreciate their significance, and are ready to engage with all aspects of them in their daily lives. To consider how knowledge of their constitutions could empower ordinary Africans and enable more involvement in governance, the paper begins by looking briefly at the concept of constitutional literacy and its relevance to contemporary developments before discussing attempts made in some African countries to promote such literacy. The paper highlights measures that are essential for fostering a culture of constitutional literacy. The crux of the argument is that the prospects for a sustained struggle for constitutional democracy in Africa would be enhanced by an actively informed citizenry that understands the content, purposes, and values of its constitutions.

The thirteen chapters that make up this book have demonstrated the significance of formal political institutions for democracy and development in Africa. However, it is important not to exaggerate the extent to which African politics has changed. The reintroduction of multiparty politics did not represent a clean break from the authoritarian era any more than the first decade of independence represented a clean break from the colonial period. During both transitions much changed, but much also remained the same. The survival of old political logics – winner-takes-all politics, neo-patrimonialism and so on – meant that in many countries the official rules of the game continued to be compromised in important ways in the 1990s. As a result, significant variations have emerged in the degree of political institutionalisation on the continent, which makes it impossible to speak of a common ‘African experience’. However, while countries with more dysfunctional institutional arrangements typically dominate the headlines, their experience should not blind us to the fact that there is strong evidence of institutional strengthening in a number of states – including some of those in which the barriers to democratisation initially appeared to be greatest. For example, term limits have become entrenched in Kenya and Nigeria, two bastions of Big Man politics, while both coup-prone Ghana and conflict-prone Sierra Leone have experienced peaceful transfers of power. These findings raise important questions: under what conditions are we most likely to see the strengthening of formal institutions in Africa? How much variation exists? What kind of theoretical framework can best capture this? Many different kinds of institutional analysis have been pursued within comparative politics, which makes providing a comprehensive overview here impossible. However, it is worth sketching out how the literature has developed over the years, because doing so highlights how it can be used to illuminate the role of political institutions in Africa. The early analysis of institutions that occurred towards the end of the nineteenth century tended to focus on how organisations such as bureaucracies should be designed (Koelble 1995). Partly as a result, it typically concentrated on the normative role of such bodies and often overlooked issues such as the empirical impact of institutions, how individuals operate within organisational structures and how they evolve over time.

The conduct of regular elections at pre-determined time is a hallmark of liberal democracy. Most African countries now conduct regular elections. However, it is generally agreed that liberal democracy is not measured only by the conduct of elections but by a consistent commitment to certain democratic and constitutional ethos. The practice of liberal democracy is a commitment to the rule of law, free, fair and credible elections, transparency and good governance among others. In Africa today, it is generally agreed that despite majority of the countries achieving democracies, bad governance, lack of development, inequalities, exacerbation of internal conflicts, and human suffering are pervasive. Scholars have argued that African countries have generally not enjoyed complete freedom despite the periodic conduct of seeming elections in many African countries. The practice of democracy in Africa has been characterized by hooliganism, banditry and citizen frustrations, leading some commentators and scholars to question the suitability of liberal democratic norms within the African space, while some other scholars advance arguments for the justification of hybrid regimes as a variant of democracy suited for the African space. This research therefore seeks to interrogate the factors exacerbating hybrid regimes in Africa, examines the suitability or otherwise of hybrid governments in Africa, the implications of hybrid regimes for constitutional development, inclusive development and further seek the reconciliation of formal democratic practices with substantive democratic practices in Africa. Enquires will be made on how democratic institutions can synergize with democratic government to deliver the dividends of democracy to the people, how democracy can impact the people and how democracy can deliver good governance and create commonwealth for the citizenry. This paper acknowledges the difficulties of seeking a uniform constitutional template that promotes liberal democracies across African states. However, this paper suggests basic constitutional democratic baseline that has the potential of meeting the fundamental aspirations of the African people.

My life is roughly divided into three parts. The first part covers my formative years: birth a few years before Ghana's independence, elementary education in a tiny rural village, secondary school in a nearby town, and undergraduate studies at the University of Ghana, where my interest in politics and public affairs was nurtured. The second part concerns the expansion of my intellectual horizons. It begins with my doctoral studies in political science at the University of California, Davis. It continues with my return to Ghana in the mid-1980s, when it was under military rule, to teach, research, and write about African politics from inside the continent. It ends with my relocation to Washington, DC, where I was exposed to the world of think tanks. Part three deals with my return to Ghana in the late 1990s. I spent the time observing and documenting Africa's democratic transitions in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. I also played a key role in the moment through two nonstate research and advocacy institutions—the Ghana Center for Democratic Development and Afrobarometer.

The detrimental effect of climate change and pollutant emissions has shifted the attention of researchers and policymakers toward renewable energy resources. To unravel the underexplored determinants of renewable energy consumption, this study examines the individual and combined effect of innovativeness, regulatory quality, trade openness, and tax attractiveness after controlling for per capita GDP, financial liberalization, inflation, and political stability. In addition, system‐generalized method of moments estimator is utilized to reduce endogeneity bias in the model. A broader sample size of 85 countries is investigated and further divides it into four sub‐panels on the basis of regime types (full democracy, flawed democracy, hybrid, and authoritarian regime). The findings indicate that innovativeness, regulatory quality, and trade openness are the major drivers of renewable energy consumption in global panel. The combined effect of innovativeness and regulatory policy is also statistically significant on renewable energy consumption. Furthermore, tax attractiveness positively moderates the relationship between trade openness and renewable energy consumption. The results differ across sub‐panels; however, the observed factors explain more variation in renewable energy consumption for full democracy and flawed democracy panels. It is suggested that economies should be shifted from authoritarianism to democracy to improve their public, industrial, trade, and tax policies which may help them to boost the consumption and production of clean energy. © 2019 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Environ Prog, 38:e13146, 2019

Support for democracy, human rights, and good governance reforms in Africa has become a prominent objective in engagement by European Union (EU) institutions, EU member states, and the United States with African countries since the early 1990s. Western actors have gradually increased democracy aid, used sanctions, and developed a range of other instruments to support political reforms on the continent. Academic research has analyzed the “substance” and “content” of political reforms that Western actors seek to promote, what instruments they use, and how effective these instruments are in different political contexts. This body of work comes to mixed conclusions as to whether and under what conditions external support has contributed to democratic reforms in African countries between 1990 and 2015. Yet, evidence suggests that external democracy support has made some positive contributions and has been more effective in Africa compared to other regions. However, after a period of 25 years during which democracy support gradually became an important element in the United States’ and European cooperation with African countries, this agenda is now under considerable pressure. Domestic challenges to democracy within Europe and the United States, domestic dynamics in African countries, and the rise of China as an alternative political model make it difficult for European and other external actors to contribute to political reforms on the continent. In this new era of uncertainty, there are three main areas to which policymakers as well as academic research should pay more attention. First, more debate is needed how the contestation of democratic norms in Europe and the United States affects not only the legitimacy but also the decision-making processes on democracy support. Second, more research is needed how urbanization, demographic change and digitalization and their combined effects influence political reforms in Africa and what implications emerge for democracy support. Finally, how China’s more proactive and assertive foreign policy will affect democracy support in Africa is an area that policy-makers and researchers should follow closely.