Democracy against Security: The Debates about Counterterrorism in the European Parliament, September 2001–June 2003

Abstract

The counterterrorism policies elaborated in the countries of the European Union (EU) in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, have been characterized by a desire to strengthen the networks of international cooperation among law-enforcement agencies, intelligence services, and the judiciary, but also by the introduction of several exceptional measures adopted usually on a temporary although sometimes on a permanent basis. Relying on the assumption that some legal guarantees for civil rights and liberties are incompatible with an efficient fight against new terrorist threats, exceptional rules have been presented as absolutely necessary for the protection of European populations. The subsequent diffusion throughout the EU of a new model of governance expressing such exceptionalist measures has provoked considerable criticism both within established political institutions and in civil societies. This article aims to analyze the public debate generated on this issue at the EU level. It focuses specifically on the debates in the European parliament between the main supporters of the exceptionalism thesis and their rivals. It especially seeks to highlight the primary arguments advanced to justify or to discredit this thesis. For this purpose, the article relies on a thematic content analysis of the debates of the European parliament on combating terrorism from September 2001 up to June 2003. (1) The analysis covers the debates held on that issue in the course of seven sittings (September 5, 2001; September 19, 2001; November 28, 2001; February 6, 2002; April 9, 2002; October 23, 2002; and March 12, 2003), and the extraordinary formal sitting of September 12, 2001. The Debates Before September 11, 2001 The impact of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on EU counterterrorism policy cannot be fully understood unless we consider that, apart from the council decision of December 3, 1998, instructing Europol to deal with crimes related to terrorism, (2) the position of the European Union toward terrorism has been limited to a strictly political level. All EU institutions have constantly condemned terrorism, but the definition of a common counterterrorism policy or, at least, the definition of their role in combating terrorism had not been integrated into their political agenda. The persistence of various forms of terrorism in several EU countries (namely, Spain, France, and Greece), its resurgence in Italy, as well as its evolution in the international context, pushed the Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice, and Home Affairs to prepare a report on the role of the European Union in combating terrorism in order to promote the creation of a common area of freedom, security, and justice. This report (A5-0273/2001) written by Mr. Watson and presented to the European deputies in the perspective of the adoption of a relevant recommendation during the sitting of September 5, 2001, calls on the council of ministers to establish common minimal laws and penalties, to abolish formal extradition procedures, to apply the principle of mutual recognition of criminal judgments, and to establish a European search-and-arrest warrant in the fight against terrorism. The Watson report gave rise to several reactions amid the European deputies and allows us, on the one hand, to examine the positions held before the 9/11 terrorist attacks with regard to the adoption of emergency rules in the name of the fight against terrorism and, on the other hand, to compare them with the ones expressed in the aftermath of 9/11. A major feature of the debate on terrorism prior to 9/11 is that, although some European deputies tackled the issue of the dangers that counterterrorist measures might imply for civil rights and freedoms in the member states, such dangers were treated as rather hypothetical and not of pressing concern. The relative lack of attention accorded to this issue is clearly demonstrated by the fact that it was addressed by only four speakers out of twenty-four (16. …