Demea's a priori Theistic Proof

Abstract

Hume's examination of the causal maxim in 1.3.3 of A Treatise of Human Nature (hereafter T) can be considered, at least in part, a thinly veiled critique of the cosmological argument, attacking as it does the privileged status of the principle upon which that proof rests (see T 1.3.3.1-9; SBN 78-82).: As well, Hume's remarks on the impossibility of demonstrating matters of fact a priori in part 3 of section 12 oAAn Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (hereafter EHU) clearly strike at the heart of the ontological argument, even if not explicitly (see EHU 12.24-34; SBN 161-5).2 Unfortunately, it is only in the very brief part 9 of his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (hereafter DNR) that Hume directly discusses, at any length, the attempt to demonstrate a priori the existence of a deity (see DNR 9.1-11; 188-92).3 The argument, put forward by Demea, and Cleanthes's criticism of that argument take up so little space that for ease of reference I will reproduce them before we proceed any further. Part 9 consists of eleven paragraphs, and in accordance with a now fairly common convention, I will refer to the paragraphs by number.41 reproduce only those paragraphs that will be the focus of this paper. Demea's Argument (DNR 9.3; 188-9):