Demand for Audit Quality in Small Private Firms: Evidence on Ownership Effects

Abstract

This study investigates the interaction between audit quality and agency costs, when managerial ownership is used as a proxy for agency costs. The literature on audit quality suggests that firms with high agency costs are more likely to demand audit quality. Our database enables us to compare the demand for audit quality with two different measures; demand for Big 4 auditors and certified auditors with strict professional requirements. The results show that an increase in managerial ownership decreases the likelihood that the firm will engage a Big 4 auditor but it does not have an impact on the demand for certified auditors. Our findings also support previous studies that suggest a nonlinear connection between managerial ownership and demand for audit quality in terms of Big 4 audits. This suggests that audits by Big 4 audit firms are used in informationally opaque private firms to overcome agency costs. We also find that the probability of choosing a Big 4 auditor increases with an increase in firm size and the presence of foreign sales. An increase in leverage increases the likelihood that the firm will engage a Big 4 auditor only in the larger firms and in firms, in which management ownership is above 50%.