Delineation and Analysis of Objectivities (Gegenständlichkeiten) in Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology (Based on “Logical Investigations,” Volume II)

Abstract

Philosophical literature in this country has its studies on the phenomenology of Husserl and his successors, their emphasis being on the theory of “pure consciousness.”1 This author has offered an interpretation of Husserl’s concept of “pure consciousness” with reference both to the phenomenological understanding of transcendentalism,2 and the specific features of the phenomenological method. Referring the reader to those works, it is the author’s intention here to supplement the evaluations of phenomenology they contain3 with a more detailed interpretation of several Husserlian texts which launched the phenomenological movement and reflected the central concepts of phenomenology. This paper concerns itself with “Logical Investigations,” not merely as a tribute to early Husserlian history, but with reference to Husserl’s claim in the second edition of “Logical Investigations” (1913) that for him it had been a work that marked a breakthrough — and not the end, but a beginning. Besides being the original statement of Husserlian phenomenology, Logical Investigations (LI hereafter for the sake of brevity) acquired fundamental significance for both phenomenology and the entire history of twentieth century Western philosophy. However, the fate of this work, published first in 1900–1901, as indeed that of early phenomenology in general, is marked by contradiction.