Abstract
This paper explores how delegation can be used as a signal to sustain cooperation. I consider a static principal–agent model with two tasks, one resembling a coordination game. If there is asymmetric information about the agent’s type, the principal with high private belief can delegate the first task as a signal. This is also supported by the forward induction argument. However, in the laboratory setting, this equilibrium is chosen only sometimes. When the subjects have information about past sessions, there is a significant increase in the use of delegation. This finding sheds light on equilibrium selection in Bayesian games.
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