Abstract
Many theoretical results rely on delayed review of imperfect information for sustaining cooperative outcomes. Using two laboratory experiments, this paper shows that delayed review can hinder cooperation in practice through a mechanism not captured by standard theory. The experiments make use of two different but closely related environments: a repeated prisoner's dilemma game with imperfect monitoring and pre-programmed grim triggers (but flexibility about what action to choose before the trigger is set off), and a decision problem played against a computer with a known strategy. At odds with the theoretical predictions, subjects cooperate less in both experiments when information is delayed. The results can be rationalized by a simple stochastic choice model with a bias toward survival.
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