Abstract
This article examines the effects of Israeli policy shifts on Syrian decision making regarding resolution of their conflict. An analytic framework developed by Maoz is used to reconstruct the structure of the Syrian decision problems in light of the positions of the Rabin, Peres, and Netanyahu governments. Mintz and Geva's poliheuristic decision model is applied to evaluate the relationship between the “difficulty” of the decision task, the process, and the outcome. Results indicate that the impact of the Netanyahu government's hard-line policy was to increase the difficulty of a Syrian strategy choice to resolve the conflict, the bargaining position of the Peres government had the same effect, and the Rabin government's moderately hard line allowed the greatest opportunity for agreement.
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