Definition and Essence in Aristotle’s Metaphysics vii 4

Abstract

We may take Aristotle’s Metaphysics vii 4 as advancing a theory about essence (to ti en einai ) and at least a part of Aristotle’s theory of definitions. The text is, however, very difficult: it is hard not only to understand each step of Aristotle’s discussion, but also how they square with each other and with the broader context of Metaphysics vii as a whole. One might be tempted to say that Aristotle hesi tates, or even contradicts himself, about criteria for definition and essence. I show that Aristotle’s treatment of essence and definition here is completely coherent and perfectly in accord with its broader context. His discussion in vii 4 offers not only minimal criteria for what counts as definition and essence for whatever kind of object, but also stronger criteria for a primary sort of definition and essence. Thereby it serves the interest of book 7 in the explanatory power of the essence of composite substances. Section 1 considers what ‘ logikos ’ means in vii 4. Section 2 examines passage 1029b13-22 in which Aristotle offers what I take to be a logikos account of mini mal features of the notions of essence and definition. Section 3 investigates the passage 1029b22-1030a2 that discusses whether this minimal notion of essence can be ascribed to accidental compounds. I also explain the possible motivation for such a concern. Section 4 explores 1030a2-17 that presents some further requirements for a stricter notion of essence. Section 5, focusing on 1030a17-32, attempts to explain how Aristotle’s minimal (or logikos ) and stricter accounts of essence and definition fit together. In section 6, at last, I show that Aristotle’s account of essence and definition in vii 4 is coherent and perfectly integrated into the account of substance in Metaphysics vii.