Abstract
We argue that definite noun phrases give rise to uniqueness inferences characterized by a pattern we call definiteness projection. Definiteness projection says that the uniqueness inference of a definite projects out unless there is an indefinite antecedent in a position that filters presuppositions. We argue that definiteness projection poses a serious puzzle for e-type theories of (in)definites; on such theories, indefinites should filter existence presuppositions but not uniqueness presuppositions. We argue that definiteness projection also poses challenges for dynamic approaches, which have trouble generating uniqueness inferences and predicting some filtering behavior, though unlike the challenge for e-type theories, these challenges have mostly been noted in the literature, albeit in a piecemeal way. Our central aim, however, is not to argue for or against a particular view, but rather to formulate and motivate a generalization about definiteness which any adequate theory must account for.
Highlights
Many thanks to audiences at Leibniz-ZAS, the NYU Mind and Language seminar, the 2019 London Semantics Day at Queen Mary, and the UCL Semantics Seminar, and to Kyle Blumberg, Richard Breheny, Keny Chatain, Simon Charlow, Cian Dorr, Patrick Elliot, Nathan Klinedinst, Lukas Lewerentz, Karen Lewis, Florian Schwarz, Yasu Sudo, and three anonymous referees for Natural Language Semantics for very helpful comments and discussion
Dynamic theories hold that definites in general are essentially variables, which must be connected to a discourse referent that has been introduced by an appropriately placed indefinite
The e-type strategy can be characterized by the following key assumptions: i) Definite descriptions have Fregean/Russellian semantics, according to which ‘The F is G’ is true if and only if there is exactly one F and all Fs are Gs; indefinites have the semantics of existential quantifiers in classical first order logic
Summary
Sentences like (1) and (2) contain anaphoric relations that are surprisingly hard to make sense of:. Dynamic theories hold that definites in general (that is, definite descriptions and pronouns) are essentially variables, which must be connected to a discourse referent that has been introduced by an appropriately placed indefinite (like ‘a donkey’) On this view, sentences such as (1) and (2) include co-indexed variables which are “bound” without c-command (i.e. without the kind of syntactic dominance which permits binding in classical theories). The second is that these uniqueness (and existence) implications are ‘filtered’ by preceding indefinites in the same way that presuppositions can be filtered by preceding linguistic material (in the terminology of Karttunen 1973) We call this latter phenomenon definiteness filtering; we call the overall empirical picture—the combination of uniqueness inferences and their filtering—definiteness projection. We hope our arguments will clarify a central desideratum for any theory of the relationship between definites and indefinites
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