Definiteness and Coherence in Sense-Perception

Abstract

In the present paper I shall be dealing in a preliminary and exploratory way with the epistemological significance of certain aspects of our perceptual experience. I shall attempt to show that there are two principles of which we often make use when, in everyday life, we estimate the reliability of particular instances of sense-perception. Assuming that this can be established, one would expect that the epistemological theories advanced by philosophers would, at some points, reflect their own everyday use of such principles. And this, as I shall suggest, has to some extent occurred. However, most philosophers have focussed their attention on more general problems than the reasons why, in specific cases, we reject one instance of sense-perception in favor of another; therefore the topics with which I am here concerned have not received the attention which I believe they deserve. The two principles with which I shall deal-a principle of definiteness and a principle of coherence-are to be construed as tacitly accepted rather than explicitly formulated. They should therefore not be expected to operate as premises for arguments; rather they represent psychological factors which serve as determinants when we assess the reliability of particular instances of perception. The discovery that there are such factors would not prejudge any issues concerning the reliability of sense-perception in general, as compared with other possible sources of knowledge. Nor would a formulation of these principles necessarily suggest the ways in which we can most effectively analyze perception and the status of that which is perceived. Furthermore, questions concerning the evidence which perception provides for our beliefs