Abstract
Call it logrolling, compromise, or serving the public interest, legislative bargaining has recently received renewed attention from political theorists. The decision handed down by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), has probably intensified this interest. Under the two-part test described in Chevron, federal courts must defer to administrative agencies as long as the agency decisions are not inconsistent with the intent of Congress.2 Recent work by Eskridge and Ferejohn illustrates the ongoing effort to model legislative bargaining.3 The authors characterize the bargaining pro-
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