Defensive capacity: the influence of the facilitation‐regulation space

Abstract

In their paper ‘Loss of Defensive Capacity in Protective Operations: The Implications of the Überlingen and Linate Disasters’ Busby and Bennett attribute the ‘defensive capacity’ of an airspace system to the behaviour of those who constitute its production‐protection space (first‐line producers like avionics manufacturers, airlines, pilots' groups and airport authorities). This paper argues that an airspace system's defensive capacity is also a function of the behaviour of those who constitute its ‘facilitation‐regulation’ space – the rulemakers (and, to some degree, the non‐statutory bodies who seek to influence them). This elaboration recognises two aspects of regulation. First that some regulators are responsible for promoting both safety and efficiency (the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for example). Secondly that regulators who prioritise efficiency over safety may reduce overall system safety and/or create opportunities (affordances) for unsafe behaviour. The argument is illustrated with reference to the National Transportation Safety Board's criticism of the FAA's human factors training programmes for air traffic controllers, its aircraft surface‐movement standards and procedures and its air traffic controller rostering practices following the 2006 crash of a passenger aircraft at Lexington, Kentucky and FAA's implementation of the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System.