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Previous article No AccessDefending Organized Crime? A NoteJürgen BackhausJürgen Backhaus Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Legal Studies Volume 8, Number 3Jun., 1979 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467625 Views: 27Total views on this site Citations: 22Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1979 The University of Chicago Law SchoolPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Giovanni Bernardo, Irene Brunetti, Mehmet Pinar, Thanasis Stengos Measuring the presence of organized crime across Italian provinces: a sensitivity analysis, European Journal of Law and Economics 51, no.11 (Nov 2020): 31–95.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-020-09676-0Ciro Biderman, João M. P. De Mello, Renato S. De Lima, Alexandre Schneider Pax Monopolista and Crime: The Case of the Emergence of the Primeiro Comando da Capital in São Paulo, Journal of Quantitative Criminology 35, no.33 (Nov 2018): 573–605.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-018-9393-xMatthew J. Baker Crime: Organized Crime and the Law, (Apr 2019): 491–495.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_16JULIA R. NORGAARD, HAROLD J. WALBERT, R. AUGUST HARDY Shadow markets and hierarchies: comparing and modeling networks in the Dark Net, Journal of Institutional Economics 14, no.55 (Jan 2018): 877–899.https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137417000613Michael Golz, Daniel J. D'Amico Market concentration in the international drug trade, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 150 (Jun 2018): 28–42.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.025Salvatore Piccolo, Giovanni Immordino Organised Crime, Insider Information and Optimal Leniency, The Economic Journal 127, no.606606 (Mar 2017): 2504–2524.https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12382Guglielmo Faldetta, Carmelo Provenzano Criminal business model and the governance of seized and confiscated businesses, Measuring Business Excellence 20, no.44 (Nov 2016): 46–60.https://doi.org/10.1108/MBE-08-2016-0045Astrid Gamba, Giovanni Immordino, Salvatore Piccolo Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2016).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2776762Paolo Pinotti The Causes and Consequences of Organised Crime: Preliminary Evidence Across Countries, The Economic Journal 125, no.586586 (Aug 2015): F158–F174.https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12238Matthew J. Baker Crime (Organized) and the Law, (Jun 2015): 1–6.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_16-1J. Mark Ramseyer Nuclear Power and the Mob: Extortion and Social Capital in Japan, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2015).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2614087Antonio Acconcia, Giovanni Immordino, Salvatore Piccolo, Patrick Rey Accomplice Witnesses and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 116, no.44 (Aug 2014): 1116–1159.https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12080Sebastian Jaén, Isaac Dyner A system dynamics approach to the study of Colombian coca cultivation and the counter-intuitive consequence of law enforcement, International Journal of Drug Policy 25, no.22 (Mar 2014): 226–234.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2014.01.010Salvatore Piccolo, Giovanni Immordino Optimal Accomplice-Witnesses Regulation under Asymmetric Information, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2012).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2142940Antony W. Dnes, Nuno Garoupa Behavior, Human Capital and the Formation of Gangs, Kyklos 63, no.44 (Oct 2010): 517–529.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.2010.00485.xSadri Slim From Rejection of Exchange to Gift: Regard as an Explanation of Prices (Du Refus De Vente Au Don: Une Explication De La Formation Du Prix Par L´Affect), SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2009).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1406693Nuno Garoupa Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 63, no.33 (Jul 2007): 461–474.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.04.010JUIN-JEN CHANG, HUEI-CHUNG LU, MINGSHEN CHEN ORGANIZED CRIME OR INDIVIDUAL CRIME? ENDOGENOUS SIZE OF A CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION AND THE OPTIMAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, Economic Inquiry 43, no.33 (Jul 2005): 661–675.https://doi.org/10.1093/ei/cbi046N Garoupa The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement, Economic Inquiry 38, no.22 (Apr 2000): 278–288.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2000.tb00017.xNuno M. Garoupa Optimal Law Enforcement and Criminal Organization, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 1999).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.159219Andrew R. Dick When does organized crime pay? A transaction cost analysis, International Review of Law and Economics 15, no.11 (Jan 1995): 25–45.https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(94)00010-R David E. Sisk Police Corruption and Criminal Monopoly: Victimless Crimes, The Journal of Legal Studies 11, no.22 (Sep 2015): 395–403.https://doi.org/10.1086/467708

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