Abstract

This article proposes a framework to mitigate cache timing attacks. The framework identifies attacks and targets by monitoring the cache access pattern and counteracts them by injecting noise using hardware prefetcher. -Rosario Cammarota, Intel Labs -Francesco Regazzoni, University of Amsterdam and Università della Svizzera Italiana.

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