Default-Switching: The Hidden Cost of Defaults

Abstract

When people make a decision that involves a pre-selected option – a default – they are more likely to select it. Due to their effectiveness, defaults have been widely implemented by public and private organizations alike. But are there cases when implementing a default can backfire? More specifically, under which conditions do defaults fail to work? One obvious situation is where the default option does not match the decision-maker’s preference. Less obvious are situations where defaults reduce perceived choice autonomy and decision-makers switch away from a defaulted option even when it matches their preferences. To show the existence of two types of motivations for default-rejection, we meta-analyzed 19 existing default studies and conducted four new lab experiments. Our studies reveal a hidden cost to the near-ubiquitous usage of defaults, whereby pre-selected options can prompt individuals to choose contrary to their preferences because they perceive lower autonomy. We also devise a novel way to deliver default implementations that does not reduce decision-maker’s perceived decision-making autonomy and reduces rates of default-rejection. We conclude with implications for the widespread usage of defaults and policy-making.