Default sensitivity in attempts at social influence

Abstract

While past research has demonstrated the power of defaults to nudge decision makers toward desired outcomes, few studies have examined whether people understand how to strategically set defaults to influence others' choices. A recent paper (Zlatev et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114, 13643-13648, 2017) found that participants exhibited "default neglect," or the failure to set optimal defaults at better than chance levels. However, we show that this poor performance is specific to the complex and potentially confusing paradigms they used, and does not reflect a general lack of understanding regarding defaults. Using simple scenarios, Experiments 1A and 1B provide clear evidence that people can optimally set defaults given their goals. In Experiment 2, we conducted a direct and conceptual replication of one of Zlatev et al.'s original studies, which found that participants selected the optimal default significantly less than chance. While our direct replication found results similar to those in the original study, our conceptual replication, which simplified the task, instead found the opposite. Experiment 3 manipulated the framing of the option attributes, which were confounded with the default in the original study, and found that the original framing led to below-chance performance while the alternate framing led to above-chance performance. Together, our results cast doubt on the prevalence and generalizability of default neglect, and instead suggest that people are capable of setting optimal defaults in attempts at social influence.