Defacement of bank going concern public secrecy

Abstract

This paper aims to deface bank going concern public secrecy. Emanating from the refusal of bank supervisory auditors to share knowledge about bank financial condition publicly and the dependence of bank statutory auditors on ineffective bank going concern opinion model, bank going concern public secrecy has hampered public appreciation of the true state of bank health. In an earlier paper, Njoku and Tinker (2011) used discriminant analysis to develop a surveillance model of going concern in banking as a means of reinforcing the audit risk model. A potency index constructed out of the modelled variables suggests going concern opinion usefulness of publicly available factors in the order of earning, market power, market presence and deposit mobilisation. The factors, therefore, deface the information asymmetry associated with the penchant of bank supervisory auditors to wrap serious supervisory concern about banking firm financial condition in secrecy and contribute to improvement in the going concern uncertainty opinion of the bank statutory auditor.