Abstract
Abstract In this paper I explore the ways in which Alexander of Aphrodisias employs and develops so-called ‘common notions’ as reliable starting points of deductive arguments. He combines contemporary developments in the Stoic and Epicurean use of common notions with Aristotelian dialectic, and axioms. This more comprehensive concept of common notions can be extracted from Alexander’s commentary on Metaphysics A 1–2. Alexander puts Aristotle’s claim that ‘all human beings by nature desire to know’ in a larger deductive framework, and adds weight to Aristotle’s use of the common understanding of the notion of ‘wisdom’. Finally I will indicate how these upgraded common notions are meant to play an important role in the general framework of metaphysics as a science.
Highlights
In Alexander’s commentary on the second chapter, he combines dialectical starting points, general agreement, and axioms into a comprehensive Peripatetic concept of common notions that can serve as reliable starting points of deductive arguments
These upgraded common notions get an important role to play in the general framework of metaphysics as a science; the deduction at the start of the first chapter depends on a common notion, found in the Nicomachean Ethics
In his Institutio logica I.5, recognizes Euclid’s common notion 1 (‘things which are equal to the same thing are equal to another’) as an axiom: If, having some prior knowledge, either through perception or demonstration, we propose some statement about the nature of things, let this statement be called a ‘premiss’; for this was the usual term among the ancients; but if it is a proposition carrying conviction of itself to the intellect, they gave it the name ‘axiom’; e.g., ‘things equal to the same thing are equal to one another’
Summary
The most conspicuous application of logic in the work of Alexander of Aphrodisias is no doubt his claim that Aristotle’s metaphysics is itself a unified demonstrative science of being qua being, of which the theory of substance. The commentary on Metaphysics Δ 16 shows the importance of Aristotle’s brief remarks on different senses of ‘teleion’ for Alexander’ connection between being complete and being good and virtuous, which Aristotle highlighted in EN 1.5, 1097a30–b21.19 Supported by these texts Alexander can use the term with respect to virtue, and more with respect to the intellectual virtues in the various stages of rational development in his De Anima.20 Against this background, it will be clear that the theoretical knowledge of first principles and causes which is at stake in the first chapters of the Metaphysics counts as the most important instance of the. I am grateful to Máté Veres and Mauro Bonazzi for alerting me to their publications and making them available to me
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
