Decolonization as a Cold War Imperative

Abstract

Legal and social historians typically think of the 1955 Bandung conference as the point of origin of the non-aligned movement in that the conference explicitly positioned itself between the Soviet and Western power blocs. This chapter seeks to problematize this premise by relating the genesis of Bandung to some of the core tenets of interwar Soviet conceptions of international law. This allows us to think of interwar ‘Soviet international law’ as a precursor to Bandung, or even as an earlier iteration of the political postures later attributed to Bandung. If there was such obvious prima facie alliance between the Soviets and the participants at Bandung, what went wrong? Why were the Soviets excluded from participating? Does the formal absence of the Soviets from Bandung actually conceal a deeper presence? To speak of Interwar ‘Soviet international law’ as a precursor to Bandung in even the most general terms suggests an inquiry into the dual role that Soviet international legal doctrine played in enabling independence movements that culminated in statehood and recognition for former colonies, while simultaneously constraining internal self-determination movements within its vast territory. Revisiting this history is important for, at least, two main reasons. First, it adds to the growing empirical account of decolonization generally, and Soviet participation (direct and indirect) in particular decolonization projects. Second, it helps to understand the complex role of the Soviet Union as both a peripheral post-imperial subject and neo-colonial actor in its own right.