Abstract
Wages frequently remain high in industries thrown into permanent decline. Previous analyses based on arbitrary wage rigidities have concluded that some degree of subsidization of the declining industry is warranted on efficiency grounds. The present paper proposes as an alternative an efficient bargaining model that generates wage stickiness and inefficiently low levels of intersectoral labor transfer. Expanding rather than declining sectors should be assisted under these circumstances.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.