Abstract
Abstract The Court’s failure to communicate the constitutional requisites for relief from school segregation in Cooper Aaron may be but a reflection of the confusion that characterized its handling of the remedy question in the Brown v. Board of Education cases. In Brown I, the Court unequivocally established the principle that the use of race as the basis for the assignment of students in the public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It determined that the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws could no longer be satisfied-as it could have been until then under Plessy v. Fergu-son-by separate and equal schools.2 “Separate educational facilities,” the Court said, “are inherently unequal.”3 It held that the plaintiffs-Oliver Brown of Topeka, Kansas; Harry Briggs, Jr., of Clarendon, South Carolina; Dorothy C. Davis of Prince Edward County, Virginia; Ethel Louise Belton of New Castle County, Delaware-and others similarly segregated “for whom the actions have been brought” were being “deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
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